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I . INTRODUCTION
A recent study was conducted by NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System of incidents in commercial aviation. During
this investigation it was discovered that an inordinate number
of errors were due to interpersonal and personal communication
failure. In the subsequent pages of this thesis, twenty-two of
these case studies will be scrutinized in order to underline
the need for a viable application of decision support system
(DSS) in the cockpit environment.
The case studies are broken into five categories. Each
incident will have the narrative leading into the study. For
additional reference, the twenty-two case studies (in their
original format) are available in Appendix A of this thesis.
The five classified categories include:
1. Retroactive Interference - The action of the individ-
ual is not identified with the problem at hand. This is
motivated by an assimulation of prior input into an on-
going program.
2. Reductive Coding - An overload of input or a complex
stages of events, prohibits the human unit from correctly
handling the situation.
3. Psychological Refractory Phase - The human unit
receives the input. However, a simultaneous transference
of this information does not occur. There is a segment

of time between the input and output, leaving a window
open to information loss or personal interpolation of
an event or incoming data.
4. Inferential Shortcomings - Application of "knowledge
structures" and "heuristics" to a situation for supposi-
tion of data which is non-existent. In short, human
error due to assumption.
5. Leadership and Crew Coordination - Protocol and the
social hierarchy of the aircraft are examined in reference
to their role in the cockpit environment.
The action/interaction of these five sections with regard
to the decisionmaking process is illustrated in Figure 1. A
single element or a combination of these elements could invoke
an error, as is revealed in the case studies.
The application of a DSS into the cockpit environment will
be presented as a tool to help alleviate some of the workload
pilots and co-pilots experience. This support could lead to
a reduction of errors. Emphasis is placed on the fact that
the human unit may continue to make errors. Only through
each crew member's realization that such reality is plausible
can a reduction of the human type error occur.
A description of "state of the art" equipment and tech-
nology in use on Boeings 75 7 and 76 7 airlines gives the
reader a perception of the onboard application of a DSS
.
Future possibilities in research and development are also
discussed. These plans could even further support the crew,

eliminating more of the crew's workload and perhaps someday
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Figure 1: Model of Action/Interaction

II. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
A. RETROACTIVE INTERFERENCE
The first error related segment to be discussed lies in
the area of retroactive interference, which is also called
prior input. The concept of retroactive interference implies
that prior input or previously learned behavior interferes
with ongoing programs [Reference 1: pp. 100]. When the
action of the individual does not meet the present require-
ment or situation, in fact is triggered from similar pre-
viously experienced circumstance or habitual response, one
is dealing with prior input. Reason defines this by stating:
"The performance of a highly practised and largely
automated job liberates the control procession from
moment-to-moment control; but since like nature,
focal attention abhors a vacuum, it tends to be
"captured" by some pressing but parallel mental
activity so that on occasion it fails to switch
back to the task at hand at a critical decision
point and thus permits the guidance of action to
fall by default under the strong motor program.
"
[Ref. 2: pp. 85]
These "slips of action" can occur during routine flights
which demand unroutine maneuvers or during times of stress
or emergency station. There are two cases in Appendix A
which exhibit examples of the aforementioned "slips of
action"
.
1. Case Study 2117
Case Study 2117 states that during a flight origi-
nating in Hot Springs, Arkansas, a clearance from the tower
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was "... V-54N maintain 5000, contact Little Rock approach
control at Benton intersection ..." The first officer read
the clearance back to tower as issued. However, the flight
misread the clearance and proceeded as cleared and (and as
filed) to 7000 ft. instead of 5000 ft. (7000 ft. is fal center
stored flight plan.) The reason for this deviation from the
control tower's instruction is explained in the call back
comment.
Narrative of Case 2117: Prior to departure from Hot
Springs (Hot) , Arkansas, airline flight received IFR
clearance for Hot Tower, ... V-5 4 maintain 5000, contact
Little Rock (Lit) approach control at Benton intersection
First officer read clearance back to tower as issued.
Flight crew misread clearance and proceed as cleared (and
as filed) to 7000 instead of 5000. (7000 is fal center
stored flight plan) . The error was not discovered until
flight reported over Benton intersection. If an altitude
verification had been required prior to Benton intersec-
tion, the incident could have been avoided. As it was,
however, flight flew one half of -the -flight segment
without being required to verify the assigned altitude
of 5000. Flight monitored Hot Tower frequency until
Benton intersection.
Case study 2117 is an example of what can happen when
there is a change from S.O.P. Although the first officer
received the altered altitude of 500Q ft. , the crew had been
so accustomed to flying the center stored altitude of 7000 ft.
that the change did not register mentally. A confusion
existed between ongoing and stored mental programs. Since
there was no emergency or crises situation which might
elicit an error from stress, the crew presumably accepted




2. Case Study 3272
Another incident involving reversal to a previous
response arose in Case Study 32 72.
Narrative of Case Study 3272: On take-off we were told
to turn right on top 7QQQ ft. I started to turn right
and co-pilot said no he read back left turn. Because
for years we have turned left on this take-off I took
the co-pilot word instead of clarifying with departure
control. Departure control stopped my turn at 270
degrees and advised me the landings were on Rwy 8 and
we were turning into traffic. We did not come close
to any other aircraft and he climbed us up our landing
traffic and continued left turn to our course.
The pilot received instructions to turn right when he reached
7000 ft. When he proceeded to execute the maneuvers, the co-
pilot informed him that he had read turn left. Since for
years they had always turned left, he allowed the co-pilot
to convince him that a left turn was the correct direction
and turned left. Naturally, the tower informed him he was in.,
error and was in fact turning into the traffic. Whether or
not the co-pilot heard the tower say "left" instead of "right"
in his mind was not expressed, but it is highly likely that
due to the previous input of always turning left he did indeed
mentally register left while he heard right. There again was
no on-going emergency during the procedure which might force
the mind to error, but none of the cases presented by NASA
in this series projected extreme emergencies or life threaten-
ing events . The errors made were usually under normal or
semi-stressful conditions. Both of the cases discussed could
have led to serious consequences had traffic been at the
appropriate altitude when the errors were committed. It is
12

difficult to guard against occurrences such as these as long
as the human element is the ultimate controller of the cockpit
environment. The tendency to regress to a more familiar method
in dealing with semi-routine actions is overwhelming. There
exists a natural bias toward prior input. The more similar
the situation, the more likely one is tended toward behavior
or action of a familiar pattern.
B. REDUCTIVE CODING
A ubiquitous role for human beings, and one in which some
characteristic biases occur, is the coding of a complex input
into a two category or few category output, perhaps in the
form of a polar decision, as approach-retreat, stop-go, on-off,
etc. [Ref. 3: pp. 353]. Campbell terms this multiple input
overflow "reductive coding". When several elements of infor-
mation/actions are occurring simultaneously, proficiency in
all direction is not easily achieved. Norman-Shallice states
that:
"To permit simultaneous action of cooperative acts and
prevent simultaneous action of conflicting ones is a
difficult job, for often the details of how the particular
actions are performed determine whether or not they con-
flict with one another." [Ref. 4: pp. 13].
Contention scheduling is performed to determine exactly which
amount of attention can be levied to various inputs and actions
If the simultaneous tasks are similar in nature and need of
performance, it is more likely that the duplicity will qualify
success in completion. However, the greater the variety or





1. Case Study 2505
There are several examples of error due to multiple
input in these case studies. In Case Number 2505 the pilot
was receiving a descent clearance when a flight attendant
entered the cockpit to inquire about close connections for
passengers upon arrival (the plane was an hour late due to
mechanical difficulties)
.
Narrative of Case Study 2505: Enroute from SHV to
DFW., cruising altitude, 16000 ft. - on the scurry
four arrival (STAR) , into DFW, we were given a descent
to 6000 ft. in the area of Gladd intersection we were
slowing at 1Q000 and the controller asked us our alti-
tude. I replied 10000 (the first officer was flying
the aircraft) . The controller replied - climb and
maintain 11000 - you are supposed to be at eleven.
We immediately climbed to 11000. (The visibility was
good and as far as I know there was no traffic conflict)
.
I told him I thought we were cleared to 6000 ft. He
said he cleared us to maintain 11000 to the laned inter-
section and then to descent to 6000. He further stated
that I read it back to,-liim__that way.. Background: We
were almost an hour late out of SHV due to a mechanical.
At the time of the descent clearance I was conferring
with the flight attendant on close passenger connections
at DFW. (I was operating the radio. The F-0 was flying
the aircraft, there was no S-O) . There was several items
in the descent clearance - descent altitude, altimeter
setting, and o.k. to disregard the speed restrictions
and probably a couple of other things. If the controller
did clear us as he stated, then I believe the situation
occurred for three reasons. 1. I misunderstood the
clearance or it did not register in my mind (the F
missed it also.) 2. Distractions in the cockpit by the
flight attendant (not her fault). 3. The common practice
of giving rapidly read descent clearances with several
items in it.
The pilot heard the clearance, read it back (exactly as given),
but wrongly interpreted the information. Where human beings
operate at near maximum capacity, selective loss - undesired
reduction of message complexity is apt to be involved [Ref.
5: pp. 336]. Information received during transmissions such
14

as this are handled by one's short term memory. Short term
memory is a place where exact wording is stored for brief
period of time, but there is a limitation to the amount of
information it can handle [Ref. 6: pp. 135], In the case
stated above, the pilot was receiving a multiple input while
trying to answer an attendant's inquisition. The added stress
from being an hour behind schedule even further complicated
the matter by occupying a portion of attention. The pilot's
ability to deal with these series of events, without an error,
is clearly exemplified.
2. Case Study 4887
Another incident involving distraction by a flight
attendant occurred in Case Study 4887.
Narrative of Case Study 4887: Clearance was received by
First Officer for flight to. cross 15 DME W. of JRR .at .or
below 23000 ft. Flight attendant discussing cabin situa-
tion with Captain. Capt. believed 23000 restriction was
for 10 DME and crossed 15 DME at little less than 24000
ft. At approx. 3500 FPM rate of descent previous cockpit
coordination had been good and correct discipline main-
tained. For some unknown reason F/O failed to question
or mention rate of descent necessary to cross correct
DME point at altitude. Capt. believing crossing was 5 MI
further east did not change descent rate as previously
planned to cross the 10 DME fix at CR below 23000 ft.
The pilot's attention was removed from his duties in the cock-
pit causing a missed clearance. The missed clearance was
further emphasized by the first officer not questioning the
rate of descent. In many of these cases there are multiple
reasons for the error - some overlapping, others enhancing
the state of confusion. This action/interaction will be
discussed more in depth in a subsequent section.
15

3. Case Study 4194
In Case Study 4194 it appears that the Captain was
so engrossed in take-off procedures that he improperly read
the take-off clearance, fixing in his mind 16000 ft. instead
of 14000 ft.
Narrative of Case Study 4194 : As Captain I misinterpreted
the assigned flight ALT. As being 16000 MSL wherein we
were assigned 14000 MSL. First Officer had read back
clearance correctly when received from CDC RDO . However,
we both neglected to set altimeter reminder (non ACCRAL
SYS) to 14000. The ALT reminder was set at 16000 (pre-
vious legs assigned ALT) . When the ATC CLRCN was received
on ground, the reminder was not reset to 14000, As Captain,
I was busy starting engines and misread the CLRNC to read
16000 ft. MSL instead of 14000 MSL. On climb out thru
15400 LAX CTR asked us our indicated ALT, we replied
passing thru 15400 for 16000. He then issued us 16000 as
assigned ALT. It is normal procedure for our airplane to
reset the ALT reminder to ft. When either CLRD for
APPCH, or cancelling IFR CLRNC. This obviously was not
done, and was a factor in this incident.
When dealing in multiple input situations, one must guard
against uncontrolled breakdowns in automatic attentional
responses. As seen in the chapter involving prior inputs,
there is a correlation to the resemblance of the two. In
prior inputs, a tendency exists to revert to a more familiar
action in a parallel situation. In a multiple input scenario,
a tendency exists to delete a step in procedure or to jumble
the information being received or improperly execute a needed
action. The attentional attitude required to "start the
engine" is more automatic in nature than his clearance recep-
tion. That is, one becomes accustomed to a certain methodical
pattern in preflight testing and take-off procedures. Receiv-
ing one's clearance is, of course, a normal portion of that
16

schema; however, it does vary usually from flight to flight.
It has not been fully incorporated into the memorized pattern
and could be the step most easily disrupted. The continual
monitoring which should be present over "semi-automatic"
actions is usurped by the automaticity of pre-flight check
lists and starting check lists. Planning and decision making
are processes that operate in the formation of intentions
which are routine [Ref. 7: pp. 197]. These are actions under
deliberate conscious control. When contention scheduling is
complete without this deliberate control, without the involve-
ment of supervisory attentional mechanisms, the response is
automatic. When there is a combination of the automatic and
semi-automatic, there tends to be a natural drift toward the
automatic which overrides the supervisory control and lends
a natural environment for error in the semi-automatic region.
4. Case Study 40 87
In Case Study 40 87, trouble-shooting (application of
planning and decision-making processes to actions already in
progress) is exemplified during a multiple input crisis.
Narrative of Case Study 4Q87: At lift off on RWY 8R our
forward entry door warning LGT came on. A decision was
made to return and land. APC vectored us for a base to
RWY 17L and CLRD us for a visual, to contact TWR on
final during this short period time, about 4 mins . The
check lists were run, LNDG gross WGT .ok'ed and while I
worked APPCH control the First Officer was advising the
CO. and MNTNC of our action. Turning base the First
Officer returned to APC and I switched to the P. A. to
advised the passengers of the problem and our intentions.
Turning finals there was a momentary distraction over
bug speed, as called by First Officer and what was indi-
cated on my airspeed indicator. This was resolved and
the APPCH made to a landing without contacting DEN TWR.
17

I believe the AMT of communication involved in such a
short time, the fact that at one point each of us worked
APC CTL while the other was attending to other contacts
(plus the distraction at the point a change to TWR would
normally be made) led to this oversight on our part,
probably from a subjective assumption the other had made
the TWR contact. The situation probably would not have
developed had one crew member stayed in contact with CTL
during the whole APPCH and it of course brings up the
need for constant vigilance against assumption.
After lift-off, the forward entry door warning light came . on
and a decision to land was made. The aircraft was vectored
for a base to a runway, they were cleared for a visual, and
were expected to contact tower on final. The check lists
were hurriedly expedited - gross weight checked and while the
pilot worked approach control, the First Officer was advising
the company and maintenance of action taken. During the base
leg turn of the landing procedure, the first officer returned
to approach control while the pilot went on the Public Address
System to advise the passengers of the problem and intentions.
During the turning to finals, there was a momentary distrac-
tion over the speed required to maintain flight verified by
the First Officer and displayed on the pilot's airspeed indica-
tor. This was resolved and the approach was made to a landing
without contacting the tower. The pilot believed that the
amount of communication in such a short time plus the distrac-
tion at the time a normal tower contact would have been made
(in addition to assumption that pilot and co-pilot believed
each other had made the contact - which will be discussed
later), created the scenario for error. During the methodical
pattern of landing procedures, which includes the contacting

of tower, a situation arose which momentarily removed the
attention away from normal landing sequences at the exact
time tower contact would have been made. Once the disruption
was handled, normal routine was established - minus tower
contact. An unexpected event arose which required an immediate
decision making process to override ongoing contention sched-
uling monitoring, and deleted a step in the landing routine.
It is not in the bounds of the author to state whether or not
that the pilot replaced one action taken for the other action
deleted. There was also the pilot's admission that both he
and the co-pilot may have each assumed the other had made
tower contact.
5. Case Study 3 318
In another case of similar error (Case Study 3318)
,
tower contact was also not made.
Narrative of Case Study 3318: We were inbound to MEM
from NO., on a downwind, west of the airport, 35L and
right were active. Visibility was 6 to 7 in haze. We
were cleared for the visual to 35L with an altitude
restriction to maintain 3000 ft we maneuvered for the
approach but couldn't get a lower because ACFT B was
on approach for 35R at 2000 ft, and we didn't have
visual contact with this ACFT. By the time we saw the
other ACFT and could be cleared out of 3000, we were
well above profile and behind on check list and crew
duties. In the rush, approach control either didn't
turn us over to tower or we failed to respond to his
instruction. In any event the landing was made without
a proper landing clearance. Separation between the two
ACFT was positive at all times and was never compromised.
The only problem was that the visual search for the other
ACFT and the delay in descent created an unusually heavy
workload on the crew.
The pilot of that flight blamed an unusually heavy workload
because of other traffic and improperly given vectors. Tower
19

contact was not made, but in this instance, no distraction
occurred which caused the deletion as in Case Study 40 87.
Even with the differences established in each case
study in this section, there remains an element of duplicity.
These errors occurred during some stage of a relatively fixed
format of action, when input was arriving from several sources
simultaneously. The format was a well learned behavior, of
an automatic or at least semi-automatic nature. In three
cases a disruption occurred which interrupted the ongoing
contention scheduling and eventually, if not directly then
indirectly, lead to an error.
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL REFRACTORY PHASE
In a communication system involving human units, errors
can occur. The input (reception, message, data) and output
(decision, action, transmission) do not always equal in
content and meaning. A machine receives a signal and trans-
mits the exact signal. In the area of human communicating,
there are very few occurrences of reception and transmission
without a certain amount of mental translation. Only rarely
is input and output performed simultaneously. There have
been studies performed which prove that the longer the delay
between the two, or the more ambigious the stimuli, the
greater effect this has on the resulting transmission [Ref.
8: pp. 341]. The term used for this segmenting of input
and output is "psychological refractory phase". It is during
this phase that human beings implement various techniques
20

which.: anticipate, rationalize, fill gaps, and create intel-
ligent communication from distorted, imperfect input. During
this data reception and transmission, it is possible to lose
the initial meaning of the message completely. Transmission
can also typically contain reconstruction and self editing
for production of a smoother, more symmetrical copy. Human
transmitters anticipate, suppressing remembered detail in
order to format the data to conform to a desired action. A
bias toward the transmitter's attitudes exists, as well as
deviations from the original input, which reconstruct the
output to become more pleasing to the recipient of the trans-
mission. This can be especially applicable to situations
where the recipient has important power over the transmitter,
i.e. pilot over subordinate crew member.
1. Case Study 013 8
Case Study 0138 yields an excellent example of human
communications error due to anticipator monitoring.
Narrative of Case Study Q138: ACFT A was cautioned for
jet blast from the departing ACFT B on RWY 19 and advised
at pilot's discretion to taxi into position and hold.
The Captain of ACFT A was working the radios and I , the
co-pilot was at the controls. The Captain acknowledged
the above clearance, I misinterpreted the clearance and
was assured in my mind we were cleared for take-off, I
taxied the airplane slowly onto the RWY to avoid the jet
blast from the departing ACFT B , as I gave the aircraft
takeoff power I heard the Captain say "cleared to go".
After becoming airborne I held best-angle-of-climb to
avoid the wake turbulence from the departing ACFT B. I
put the gear in the up position, at that time I heard
the tower issue us traffic on 29. The next thing I saw
was an ACFT B pass slightly behind and below us as we
crossed the 19/29 intersection. Then the tower came
back and apologized for clearing us to take-off, we
continued the flight as planned. Later I found out that
21

the Captain asked me "if we were cleared to go", I only
heard him say "clear to go". If I had any doubts they
were abolished by that statement. I don't know why I
misunderstood the clearance, I haven't heard the tapes
yet. I believe something in the clearance indicated to
me we were cleared to take-off.
The aircraft was cautioned about the jetblast from another
departing aircraft and advised, at the pilot's discretion,
to taxi into position and hold. The pilot was working the
radio. The co-pilot was at the controls. The Captain
acknowledged the above clearances. The co-pilot "assured in
his mind" that they were cleared to go, misinterpreted the
clearance. The co-pilot taxied the plane slowly onto the
runway to avoid the jet blast from the departing plane. As
he gave the plane take-off power, he heard the Captain say
"cleared to go" (when in actuality the Captain had just
inquired from the tower, "Are we cleared to go") . The co-
pilot stated later that he could not understand why he had
misinterpreted or misunderstood the clearance.
It is easy to understand why the co-pilot misunder-
stood the clearance. He mentally translated the input to
placate, his anticipation. Campbell states in systematic
error:
"Studies in perception and learning clearly indicate
the loss of input elements in a complex and haphazard
fashion, if not strictly random. But the operator does
not produce an output of this type from meaningful or
familiar material. Instead, through an anticipator
monitoring of his own intended output, he makes an
active effort to produce a coherent output by suppres-
sing remembered detail that does not now seem to fit
and by confabulating detail where gaps are conspicuous."
[Ref. 9: pp. 342].
22

2. Case Study 2137
Another incident involving anticipatory monitoring
occurred in Case Study 2137.
Narrative of Case Study 2137: After landing on 2MR which
is one of the south runways, I taxied north toward the
terminal building, which is north of Runway 26. The nor-
mal route was not used, due to about 150 ft. of Runway
33 being closed. (Runway 33 is the normal taxi route) I
mention that this information was not given to me by
ground control or NTAMS or ATIS . This did not contribute
directly to the incident, but indirectly. On arrival on
Taxiway C, paralleling Runway 3 3 and holding short of
Runway 26. I was Number 3 to cross Runway 26. However,
there was another airline ACFT B outbound on Taxiway C
on the north side of 26 which helped to create the prob-
lem. After sitting for a couple of minutes, ground
control cleared ACFT B across Runway 26 , but used the
wrong trip number twice and also the pilot missed one
transmission. By the time this was straightened out,
it was too late for anyone to cross, due to departures
off 26. After a couple more minutes, this trip was
cleared across and I was Number 2 to cross. There had
been several transmissions during this time that were
broken or garbled and the outbound traffic was getting
impatient about how they were going to., get- by .the. inbound
traffic. After more waiting, there was a break in depar-
tures and they cleared two or three more trips across
Runway 26 which I thought I was one. The First Officer
tried to confirm this, but got no reply from Ground Con-
trol, which I took as another indication that we were
already cleared. After crossing the runway and being
almost to the gate, ground control asked if 660 was across
the runway and the F/O replied, we were. Ground Control
comments was good luck. I feel the cause of this incident
(which happens very frequently here in Atlanta) is the
fact that under normal conditions at busy times of the day,
Ground Control frequencies are overloaded and jammed and
handling more traffic than one man on one frequency can
control and when taxi routes are closed it compounds the
problem.
The aircraft had landed and due to the normal runway being
closed, another was used. The pilot was vectored to a taxiway
and instructed to hold before crossing another runway (a sort
of intersection it seems with heavy traffic) . A couple of
23

minutes elapsed. Control gave permission for another aircraft
to cross this intersection, mixing up trip numbers twice, so
in the confusion it was too long for anyone to cross. Several
more minutes passed, outbound traffic was getting impatient.
The pilot of the aircraft in question was getting impatient
and there had been several garbled transmission. There was a
break in departures and control cleared two or three more air-
craft to cross the runway. The pilot understood he was one.
His First Officer tried to confirm this, but received no reply
from ground control- He took, the silence as another indication
he was cleared to go.
It is not stated what was in the transmission which
caused the pilot to think, he was cleared with the other air-
craft to cross the intersection. General inclinations are
that he created the clearance from the transmission to con-
form to his desired action. His impatience gave way to his
anticipatory monitoring and he heard what he wished to hear.
3. Case Study 563Q
Another aspect of error through misinterpretation is
depicted in Case Study 5680.
Narrative of Case Study 5680: When the original clear-
ance was received RWY 5 was in use. The clearance was
a TULANCLINGO DEPT. (Via ME to TCG) . Upon departing
terminal the active runway was changed to RWY 23. After
take-off on RWY 23R, departure control's clearance was
to proceed to MW then turn right to heading 340 Deg.
The co-pilot was flying the aircraft and apparently
missed the clearance from departure control and started
a left turn as per the TCG departure. Language problem
contributed to the misunderstanding of the clearance,
in the left turn I said to the. co-pilot, "We were
suppose to turn to the right", and he assured me the
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correct turn was to the left. As we were in the left
turn, departure control came on and advised us that we
were cleared for a right turn. I explained that we had
misunderstood the clearance and that we were proceeding
to ME for ATCG departure. Departure control then cleared
us to ME and a change of frequency, and at that time
nothing more was said of the incident. In retrospect,
better cockpit discipline would have prevented this
incident.
In this flight, the First Officer was at the controls and
apparently missed the revised clearance to turn right after
take-off to a heading of 340 deg. He was following the
original clearance, which instructed the aircraft to turn
left. As the co-pilot was executing the left turn, the
pilot informed him that they were supposed to turn right.
The co-pilot - assured of his actions - insisted that a left
turn was correct. During the turn, departure control came
on and advised them that they were cleared for a right turn.
An analysis of this case done by NASA intimates that
both pilot and co-pilot did not register the clearance. This
is believable, otherwise why would the pilot let his First
Officer talk him out of what he believed he heard. There has
been considerable interest in the relative advantage of the
first portion over the latter [Ref. 10: pp. 343]. In this
case it seems the co-pilot retained the initial clearance
and completely dismissed the. later clearance when given. It
is possible that he did not copy the second clearance due to
high cockpit noise, inattention, or heavy workload. It could
also be a factor of thinking left turn (as previously given)
when actually hearing right turn. The co-pilot must have
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been extremely sure he was correct to override the pilot's
objection. Normally, an inferior will yield, not only to his
superior's authority, but also to the experience that author-
ity represents. Whatever the true cause, one should not rule
out the possibility that the. co-pilot anticipated what he
would hear and confabulated the phrase to sublimate the anti-
cipation.
4. Case Study 5699
This tendency toward making output like expected input,
rather than different from expected input happens frequently
[Ref. 11: pp. 349]. An excellent example of this is demon-
strated in Case 5699.
Narrative of Case Study 5699: ATC told us to expect
250KT. and 10000 ft. restriction at saddle intersection,
but didn't give us a clearance to descend. I repeat the
clearance to the controller and asked the co-pilot who
was flying if he understood, he said yes. ATC kept us
330Q0 ft longer than normal and did not tell us they had
traffic at 31000 ft. We were well past normal descent
point and I turned to get something out of my flight bag.
While I was looking for the object the co-pilot started
a descent without my knowledge. The altitude alerter
went off and the co-pilot reset it to 10000 ft. I did
not hear the alerter go off. ATC asked if we were
descending, I looked at the altitude and we were at
31700 ft. I immediately told the co-pilot to climb and
told ATC that we had left our altitude by mistake. He
(ATC). then cleared us to 10000 and said we had traffic
at 31000. The co-pilot had about 4 months as co-pilot.
I think he became nervous that he was so high and turned
the expected clearance in his mind to an actual clearance.
The Air Traffic Controller gave the flight an expected 250 KT
at 10000 ft with a restriction at a certain intersection, but
did not give them a descent clearance. The pilot repeated
the clearance to the Controller and asked the co-pilot, who
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was flying the aircraft, if he had copied it. The co-pilot
replied in the affirmative. Air Traffic Control kept them at
33Q00 ft longer than normal and did not inform the flight of
traffic at 31000 ft. They were well past the normal descent
point, when the pilot turned to recover something from his
flight bag. As the pilot was thusly occupied, the co-pilot
began to descent without the pilot's knowledge. The altitude
alerter sounded and was reset to 100Q0 by the co-pilot. Air
Traffic Control asked if the aircraft was descending. The
pilot checked the altimeter, acknowledged affirmative, that
they had left their altitude by mistake. The pilot stated in
the narrative that the co-pilot only had about four months in
the cockpit. He also stated that he felt the co-pilot had
become nervous that he was so high "turned the expected
clearance in his mind to an actual clearance". Studies by
Wyatt and Campbell (1950) indicated a stronger bias toward
interviewer's expectations than interviewer's opinions in
polling situations (which is intense) . These expectations
or "anticipations" are certainly exemplified in the cases
presented in this segment.
5 . Case Study 5740
In Case Study 5470, the co-pilot completely ignored
the clearance because he did not understand it.
Narrative of Case Study 5740: Our aircraft arrived in
OMA, I went into the operations office to check WX, and
use the restroom. On returning to the aircraft I asked
the F.O. if we had an ATC clearance. He replied that
we did and I asked him what it was. He said cleared as
filed maintain 5000 expect 11Q0Q 10 min. After departure
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Our flight plans ara all center stored and I asked
him are we filed, to verify the routing I had on my
center stored flight plan and his, as filed, was the
same, as MY as filed, namely V15 9 STJ direct MIC. The
departure went normally and we were handed off to center
(Minneapolis) As I flew the ACFT on the previous routing
to 11Q00 and we crossed OMA VOR and proceeded on course
V159. Approx. 25 NM S.E. of OMA VOC as we were being
handed off to Kansas City center Minneapolis asked are
you flying the Omaha 1 arrival. I answered that we
weren't that it was my understanding we were cleared
V159. He said that we weren't but we could work it out
with Kansas City. Hand off was detected and Kansas City
turned us to 165DEG. And vectored us the approach gate
at Kansas City. I again asked the F/0 for the clearance
that he copied and he said that it was his mistake that
he did not know what Omaha 1 arrival meant and that he
checked my approach plates and his and neither of us had
a Omaha SID. by that name so he ignored it but read the
clearance back, Kansas City as filed maintain 5000,
expect 11000 10 min. after departure. And that Omaha
clearance delivery accepted the read back and that he
did not think to ask me about Omaha One arrival when I
returned to the aircraft. I felt like I had been sold
down the river by an otherwise very trustworthy, compe-
tent F/O. Clearly, he made a serious mistake as I suppose
I did in not checking the clearance with clearance deli-
very. To do so however would surely leave your F.O. with
the feeling that, this guy doesn't trust me, which is now
the case. But on the other hand trust, coordination are
definitely necessary for a safe operation. While cross
check is a healthy, worthwhile cockpit activity, it
becomes counter productive when one crew member feels
he is getting a check ride from the other crew member.
For this reason, I probably won't question the next
clearance I get from this or any other F.O., but I'll
be uneasy. The nagging fear that he may have miscopied
or misunderstood will be in the back of my mind. Many
of our days require 14 hrs in the cockpit. The physio-
logical needs of crew members necessitate that all are
not going to be present in the cockpit at all times.
This tendency, of course, presents a more conscious effort to




6. Case Study 3077
Human units engaged in communication can receive
data and during the transitory process segmenting input and
output, interpolate what they consider to be a more logical
method of implementation. In Case 30 77, this occurred as a
flight was being vectored for an approach.
Narrative of Case Study 3Q77: While being vectored for
an approach and landing on RWY 22R approach., the following
took place. Approach control when querried as to other
traffic stated that we. were his only IFR traffic but nume-
rous others were arriving from other sectors and that he
was working on a slot for us. The potential problem arose
as the controller turned and descended us from a close
high right downwind leg (0 40 DEC HDG.) to a 80 DEG.
heading, while calling out the position of the traffic
we were to follow on final. The Captain mistook the
heading to be 180 DEG. as this was a logical heading to
intercept final as the downwind as somewhat tight to the
runway. I acknowledged the 80 DEG heading and look out
the window for the 1:00 o'clock traffic at 3 miles. The
only traffic I saw appeared a 2:0Q to 2:30 and looked to
be 5 or 6 miles. I asked the controller if this was our
traffic and he replied with "What's your heading" I
looked back into the cockpit to discover we were turning
thru 170 DEG. I told the controller we were 170 DEG
correcting back to the assigned. At this point the
Captain and I saw our traffic at 11:00 o'clock 2 1/2 to
3 miles. The controller said the heading should be east-
erly. I then acknowledged the traffic and we were then
cleared for a visual approach. We made a left turn and
one S turn to position ourselves behind the traffic and
proceeded without further confusion to the airport and
landed. The conditions here in marginal VFR weather
could be a setup for a near miss or mid-air. Fortunately,
we were in clear air. Pilots and controllers anticipating
visual approaches to expedite arrivals, save fuel and in
general ease the burdens of day to day air operations
situations. Hopefully this contribution can be of assis-
tance in developing procedures and techniques for smoother
and safer transitions.
Approach control, when querried as to other traffic, stated
that they were his only traffic but numerous other aircraft
were arriving from other sectors and that he was working on
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a slot for them. The potential problem arose as the control-
ler turned and descended them from a close high right downwind
leg (040 degree heading) to an 80 degree heading while calling
out the traffic they were to follow on final approach. The
Captain mistook the heading to be 180 degrees, as this was a
logical heading to intercept final approach since the downwind
was rather tight for the runway. The co-pilot acknowledged
the 080 heading and began to search for traffic, only to dis-
cover it was in the wrong place. When the co-pilot asked
control if that was the traffic, control replied, "What is
your heading?" The co-pilot checked the cockpit and found
that they were on a 170 visavis Q80 degree heading and in-
formed the pilot. After vectoring to the proper heading,
they were cleared for a visual and proceeded to land. The
co-pilot stated that pilots and controllers who are anticipa-
ting visual approaches might (in order to expedite arrivals,
save fuel, and in general ease the burdens of day to day air
operations) enter into this type of potentially hazardous
situation. The pilot, in this case, used his own judgment
for confabulating the given heading to read what he thought
as a more logical heading.
D. INFERENTIAL SHORTCOMING
There are twenty-two case studies represented in this
thesis. Nine of these case studies provide examples of
error by assumption. Webster defines assumption as, "... the
act of taking for granted, or supposing; a supposition." In
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their book Human Inference: Strategies and shortcomings of
social judgment, Richard Nisbett and Less Ross thoroughly
examine error by human inference (assumption) [Ref. 12 pp. 7].
It portrays people as intuitive scientists who are gifted
and generally successful, but whose attempts to understand,
predict and control events in the social sphere are seriously
compromised by specific inferential shortcomings [Ref. 13:
pp. 3] . It is this tendency to predict and control events
merely on intuitive cognition that pertains to the case
studies in question. The same tools the intuitive scientist
uses which cause success, also lead to error. These tools
are labeled by Nisbett and Ross as "knowledge structures"
and "judgmental heuristics".
Knowledge structures include events or data which exist
in the human memory. These knowledge- structures label and
categorize objects and events quickly. They also define a
set of expectations about objects and events and suggest
appropriate responses to them. Judgmental heuristics are
divided into two subcategories: representativeness heuristics
and availability heuristics. Representativeness heuristics
allows the individual to reduce many inferential tasks to
what are essentially simple similarity judgements. An object
or event is assigned to one conceptual category rather than
to another according to the extent to which its principle
features represent one category more than another. The
availability heuristic is implemented when judging frequency
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and statistical probability and is fallible because more
factors are involved than just these two.
An application of this data to the cockpit environment is
easy to portray. The crew is taught procedures through repe-
tition of action and an application of one's experiences. In
fact, a "seasoned" pilot is highly regarded. He/she has suc-
ceeded in making many decisions, judments, and actions in a
fashion which displays knowledge and intuitiveness . As stated
before, the very elements leading to success can also lead to
error. The line of demarcation dividing the two is faint but
existing. There are those areas which lie beyond the realm of
inferential deductions - assumption. Pure fact and data are
needed. This is one area in which machines excel - machines
do not assume. Human units use previous knowledge and expe-
rience to reduce the complex tasks of assessing probability
and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In
general, these mental actions are useful, but they can lead
to severe and systematic errors [Ref. 14: pp. 326]. Pilots
should guard against using knowledge structure and judgmental
heuristics in lieu of precise data.
1. Case Study 2536
An example of implementation of knowledge structures
is presented in Case Study 2536.
Narrative of Case Study 2536: The Captain was flying,
myself co-pilot copies change of clearance from J79.1LM
ARl to direct HAW ARZ after copying clearance I looked
at the Captain and though, he indicated he got the new
clearance as he changed the VOR FREQ from 1LM to HAW.
But due to the high noise level in the cockpit he did
32

not hear all of the. clearance. After HAW he kept what
appeared to me to be a wind correction, unknown to me
he was proceeding to 1LM. Just about 1LM the center
questioned our route of flight, then immediately changed
our clearance back to 1LM-AR1. No evasive action required
The co-pilot thought the pilot understood the clearance, but
due. to high noise level in the cockpit, the pilot did not hear
all the clearance. The pilot "gave an indication" that he
had received the clearance. More than likely, the co-pilot
drew upon past experience with, this pilot and read body
language to be reception of clearance. (Body language being
nodding of head, movement of hand, or facial gestures which
might indicate an affirmative reply.) The analysis of this
incident states the danger involved. "An assumption on the
co-pilot's part that could have led to serious consequences
had other traffic been involved. An example of what can
result when all clearances are not verified by all crew
members." The co-pilot should have received verbal acknowl-
egment of the clearance instead of relying on inference.
2. Case Study 29 3 3
In Case Study 2933, an example of availability
heuristics is portrayed.
Narrative of Case Study 2933: On the ground at PAX the
F.O. called for ATC clearance SEA. Clearance was as
filed - maintain 9000 - expect FLT level 200 3 min.
after departure. Departure FREQ. and transponder code
was also given. I missed the first portion of the
clearance and picked it up at F.L. 200 (the center
stored ALT.) and got the FREQ. and transponder code.
I set 20000 in the ALT. Alert unit and set in the
transponder code as the F.O. read back the clearance,
again I did not hear the 9000. restriction and asked if
we were cleared as filed - the F.O. answered yes. I
thought I understood the entire clearance. The F.O.
33

made the takeoff and I changed to DEPT. control and
reported leaving 10.00 FT and climbing to F.L. 200 -
the controller said ROGER and gave us additional climb
instructions which included a heading change at at 2500
FT at about 800 FT the F.O. asked if we had been cleared
to 20000 and I replied, Yes - at 10000 FT the controller
asked what ALT. We had been to and again I replied 2000 0.
He said we should have been stopped at 9000 then cleared
to F.L. 20Q and asked us to expedite thru 11000 which we
did. The F.O. later said we had been cleared to 9Q00
originally, but thought we had been recleared to F.L. 200
and he had missed the reclearance. The crew composition
helped create this situation as the F/O regularly flew
this trip, the Capt. was a management pilot who hadn't
flown the route recently and the S/O was a reserve who
was totally unfamiliar with the route. The F/0 on taxi-in
at PDX, unknown to the Capt. had set 90 00 FT in ALT.
ALERT SYS. in anticipation of what he knew was a normally
ALT. restriction for departure, when the Capt. thought the
was given F.L. 200 with the clearance he set in that alti-
tude replacing the 9000 FT - this was missed also by the
F.O. and he read back the clearance and was not rechecked
for a proper setting prior to takeoff. The Capt. checked
in with departure control after takeoff and stated he was
climbing to F.L. 200 and received no correction. When the
F.O. asked if we had been cleared to 2000 FT and got a
positive answer he assumed he had missed something and
continued to climb thru 9 0.0 FT.
While awaiting departure the First Officer checked with the
Air Traffic Controller to see if the clearance was as filed.
Air Traffic Control replied maintain 9000 FT and expect flight
level 20000 FT three minutes after departure. The departure
frequency and transponder code was also given at this time.
The pilot missed the first portion of this clearance, hearing
only 20000 FT. He picked up the departure frequency and the
transponder code as the First Officer read back the clearance,
still missing the 90Q0 FT . restriction . He asked the First
Officer if they were cleared as filed and the First Officer
replied in as affirmative. The pilot believed he had under-
stood the entire clearance. He inferred, filled gaps,
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thinking what he understood was correct. (Had the co-pilot
read back the entire, clearance at this point all misunder-
standing would have been alleviated.) The First Officer made
the. take-off and the pilot changed to departure control and
reported leaving 100QQ FT and climbing to 20000. The Con-
troller said, "Roger", and gave them additional climbing
instructions which include a heading change. At 8000 FT the
First Officer asked if they had been cleared for 2000 FT and
the pilot replied, "Yes." At 1Q0QQ FT the Controller wanted
to know what altitude they had been cleared to and the pilot
stated 20000 FT. The Controller told them they should have
leveled off at 900Q FT. The. First Officer later stated to
the pilot that they had originally been cleared to 9000 FT.
The co-pilot was used to flying this route and had preset
the altimeter alarm at 9000 FT. The pilot, not knowing this,
had reset it to 2000Q FT. The co-pilot assumed he had missed
the reclearance when he asked the pilot if they were cleared
to 2Q000 and received a positive reply. The co-pilot had
concluded a set of expectations from affirmative inference
he had received from the pilot and the fact that the altitude
alarm had been changed. He "deduced" that the pilot had
received another clearance with the additional climbing
instruction. Nesbitt & Ross state.:
"The availability heuristic is used to judge the.
frequency and likelihood of events and event-relations.
Since the availability of remember events is sometimes
biased at the stage of sampling, sometimes at the stage
of encoding, and sometimes at the stage of retrieval,
frequency and likelihood estimates often will be biased
correspondingly." [Ref. 15: pp. 42]
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3. Case Study 5381
In Case 5381, judgmental inference using representa-
tiveness heuristics is depicted.
Narrative of Case Study 5381: Myself and the rest of
crew dead headed from HIS to PIT on Flight 204 and
proceeded to Gate 16 where outbound equipment for Flight
231 was scheduled for departure, at approximately 1340E.
We found Flight 28 7 still on gate. Maintenance informed
us our aircraft was still at the hanger and would be
parked on Gate 16. We left our bags and proceeded to
operations. In operations we checked T.V. monitor which
indicated Gate 16 aircraft still at hanger. I proceeded
in completing of flight plan which indicated PIT to SDF
fuel load 22000 lbs. Captain Whelchel and myself dis-
cussed enroute weather of thunderstorm lines etc.
Periodically checking TV monitor. At approximately 1355E
(1755Z) the TV monitor still indicated aircraft at hanger
but decided to proceed gate anyway. Captain and myself
arrived at Gate 16 at approximately 1400E (1P00Z) and
found aircraft at the gate. I performed walk around
inspection while Captain boarded the aircraft. When I
boarded the aircraft I found fuel slip for 24600 lbs
in area of radar scope and placed it on my side assuming
that extra fuel was added because of weather enroute. I
proceeded to read check list to Captain and at fuel, oil,
hydraulic quantities checked fuel slip and informed Capt.
I had fuel slip and completed check list. We were ready
for push back at 1410E (1810Z) on schedule and contacted
ground control, also during, push back I was receiving
ATC clearance. After completing after start check list
proceeded to Runway 28R, completing before take off check
list. At this time I added an additional 2600 lbs of
fuel to take off weight and gave corrected take off weight.
Since it was my leg to fly, I performed normal take-off
at 1416E (1816Z) and climb out. At approximately 15000
FT. I changed to center tank and noticed no fuel in center
I immediately looked and informed Captain that no fuel was
in center tank, who by this time was looking at fuel
quantities also. Captain said "something crazy here".
We leveled off at approximately FL210 and I pulled power
back while we were determining the problem. After discus-
sing the matter, we decided we had to go with the present
place for landing to have checked. We contacted systems
control and received amended release to CMH at 14 27E
C1827Z) 11 minutes after take off. At this time, during
descent into CMH we informed flight attendants of the
problem and that we were landing at CMH, also informed
normal landing at 1447E (1847Z) and taxied to gate. At
the gate, we had dip sticks and all gauges checked and
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found fuel to agree with indications. We had aircraft
fueled and informed passengers that the problem had been
corrected and we were taking on additional fuel as a
precaution and for weather. We then proceeded to SDF
with everything normal.
During a pre-flight inspection, the co-pilot discovered a
smudged fuel slip in the cockpit. The fuel slip was for
more fuel than needed on this particular flight, but the
co-pilot "assumed" the extra fuel was to compensate for bad
weather they would encounter enroute. The. co-pilot proceeded
to read the checklist to the Captain and at fuel, oil, hydrau-
lic levels checked the fuel slip and informed the Captain that
he had the fuel slip. It was not until take-off, during a
routine check of fuel tank gauges, that the pilot and co-pilot
simultaneously noted that there was a low reading on the amount
of fuel on board.
The co-pilot made his judgment based on the perceived
similarity of the known "like characteristics" of the event
to the presumed essential characteristics of the category
[Ref. 16: pp. 42]. He knew that extra fuel would be needed
in rough weather, he found the fuel slip on the aircraft in
the radar area (not an unusual place for a fuel slip to be
lef tl . Therefore, he decided that this fuel slip was for
his flight. Nesbitt and Ross state:
"The representativeness heuristics of a given structure,
including the similarity of quite, superficial and inci-
dental features of the stimulus to features of the
stimulus to features of the structure, may be the chief
determinant of the arousal and application of a given
structure." [Ref. 17: pp. 42]
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The co-pilot made his assumption based on events, of similar
structure.. The factors he had used in weighing his decision
were great enough to remove any doubts that the fuel slip was
not for the aircraft in which it was found.
The application of knowledge structures, availability
heuristics and representativeness heuristics to the case
studies presented, indicates how the human unit might apply
them to a cockpit environment. As stated in the beginning of
this section, their use in everyday matters for judgmental
actions can lead to kudos as well as errors. It is not the
existence of heuristics and knowledge structures that is
being criticized, but their overuse, misuse, and use in
preference to more appropriate strategies [Ref. 18: pp. 42].
E. LEADERSHIP AND CREW COORDINATION
The cockpit environment supports a mini-organization.
Within this organization exists a social hierarchy. The
leader of this hierarchy is the captain. He is the one per-
son held responsible for his group's goal directed behavior.
An individual established in such an authoritarian position
is expected to plan, coordinate, direct, and control the
task-relevant activities of those individuals for whom he has
responsibility [Ref. 19: pp. 318]. By being captain and
enforcing the authority needed to achieve the directed goals,
this person of responsibility is demonstrating "leadership".
While, in this position of responsibility the captain of the
aircraft may be expected to direct the behavior of others,
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and reward or reprimand according to performance of duties
assigned or established. The. leadership a captain displays
while in command of a commercial aircraft is essential to
the lives of the passengers and crew aboard as well as the
safety of the ground crew personnel. The captain has not
attained his position simply on the ability to influence his
subordinates, or the skill with, which he can fly the aircraft,
or by the instinct, common sense, and intelligence that might
enable him to make command decisions. It is a combination of
these three traits that are required, plus an innate sense to
recognize situational and individual factors, which comprise
the leadership capabilities of a captain.
As stated in the previous paragraph, the captain is the
leader of the social hierarchy, or group, in the cockpit.
The captain, crew and passengers all are members of this
group. It is particularly cohesive society with its own
code of behavior. The passengers onboard strongly need to
believe in the crew. The crew wishes to fulfill their obli-
gations in a way which pleases the passengers. This is
further emphasized by the owner of the airline to which the
crew belongs. Therefore, within the aircraft there exists
a high degree of group conformity, and a strong reciprocal
and interacting desire to please [Ref. 20: pp. 138]. Precise
crew coordination and an affective leadership are traits
essential to the sublimation of this group goal. There are
times when a need to conform or to please prohibits achieve-
ment of the group goal.
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In previous sections, different aspects have been dis-
cussed which, have led to errors in the cockpit environment.
Leadership and crew coordination, when properly implemented,
could alleviate the error in many instances. On the other
hand, lack of these two traits could further enhance an
already bad situation. Proper interaction between pilot and
co-pilot is needed at all times. The desire to please,
however, can stand in the way and attainment of an error-free
flight placed in jeopardy. Unless the co-pilot is given some
take-offs and landings, and opportunities to make his own
judmental decisions, he begins to have a low opinion of him-
self as simply a flap-raiser and general dogsbody. His opin-
ion of his captain is formed largely from how much independence
he is allowed. In order to maintain good cockpit relations,
there is pressure on the captain to allow his first officer
these opportunities.
1. Case Study 5680
In Case Study 568Q (discussed previously in the
section dealing with the psychological refractory phase) the
first officer insisted his turn to the left was the correct
maneuver. The captain, who had heard the clearance correctly,
informed the first officer of the error. However, the first
officer overrode the arguments of the pilot and proceeded
with an incorrect turn. The intertwining of the two elements
Clack of leadership and the psychological refractory phase)
emphasizes that several factors can contribute to or enhance
40

the error that occurs. In this case, had the captain heen
more aggressive in asserting his leadership the error could
have been halted before, departure control discovered it.
2. Case Study 5740
Another incident exhibiting a captain's submission
to a co-pilot is depicted in Case Study 5 740 (see section on
inferential shortcomings for narrative) . The captain had
departed the cockpit to use the restroom and left the co-
pilot in full command. While the. captain was gone the
co-pilot received a clearance he did not fully understand.
Rather than seem a fool, for not understanding, he ignored
that part he did not understand. When the captain returned
the co-pilot did not ask him for an explanation. Eventually,
the error caused by the co-pilot's stupidity was discovered
by Air Traffic Control. The pilot very explicitly stated in
the narrative how he felt about the entire sequence
:
"I asked the First Officer for the clearance he had
copied. He said that it was a mistake. That he did
not know what Omaha One arrival meant by that name so .
he ignored it but had read the clearance back as given
and that Omaha clearance accepted the readback. He did
not think to ask me about Omaha One arrival when I
returned to the cockpit. I felt like I had been sold
down the river by an otherwise very trustworthy, compe-
tent First Officer. Clearly, he made a serious mistake
as I suppose I did in not checking the clearance with
clearance delivery. To do so, however, would surely
leave your First Officer with the feeling that this guy
doesn't trust me, which is now the case. But on the
other hand, trust and coordination are definitely
necessary for a safe operation. While cross-checking is
a healthy and worthwhile, cockpit activity, it becomes
counter productive when one crew member feels he is
getting a checkride from the other crew members . For
this reason, I probably won't question the next clearance
I get from this or any other First Officer, but I'll be
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uneasy. The nagging fear that he may have miscopied or
misunderstood the clearance will be in the back of my
mind. Many of our days require. 14 hours in the cockpit
and the physiological needs of crew members necessitate
that all are not going to be present in the cockpit at
all times."
This case study is also an example of the First Officer trying
to please the captain. In I960, the psychologist Harvey found
that the second highest member of a group was the most con-
forming [Ref. 21: pp. 149].
The status of the captain in the small group communi-
ty of the. cockpit may exert pressure on the rest of the crew
members to conform to his way of thinking or completing a
given task. It may hinder intelligent interaction and ade-
quate monitoring. Norms have defined the respective roles
on the flight deck, and regulated the overall hierarchy of
behavior within the group. One of the more deadly forms of
conformity is that it may inhibit action, making a person
yield his right to express an opinion.
This is quite evident in Case 2933 (see the section
on inferential shortcomings for this narrative) . The First
Officer had routinely flown this route, the captain was a
management pilot. The pilot who had missed most of the
clearance reset the altimeter which, had been preset by the
co-pilot prior to departure. The co-pilot knew what the
clearance would be because CMS he flew this particular flight
regularly. As they exceeded the proper clearance level, the
co-pilot did not question the pilot's actions. He more or
less assumed the pilot knew what he was doing.
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The First Officer provides the feedback for the
captain. If he mirrors, his agreement (or fails to voice his
disagreement) over some faulty assessment of a flying situa-
tion or over some wrong flying technique, the captain will
receive reinforcement for his error and the aircraft may be
doomed [Ref. 22: pp. 149].
Crew coordination and leadership are two essential
elements in a cockpit environment. They promote careful
monitoring and quick action which- are needed safeguards
against errors. In addition, one of the biggest safety
devices in an aircraft is individual judgment and noncon-
formity. The truthful support of another human being on the
flight deck in regard to air safety cannot be exaggerated.
As a leader, the captain should realize the value of the
other crew member's judgment, even when it differs from his
own. He should not, however, override his own experience




Ill . THE ADVENT OF DSS TO THE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT
There has been much emphasis placed on the fallability
of the human unit in previous sections of this thesis. This
is, after all, a study of documented errors in human communi-
cation, whether it was a breakdown of communication between
two human units or the incorrect reception or interpretation
of data from a single unit. In remembrance to an often
quoted passage ... "To err is human," ... One must take into
account the fact that these errors studied could have led to
fatal consequences. There has been an abundance of bruhaha
over the fact that statistically one is far safer in commer-
cial aircraft than on the streets and highways of the world.
Statisticians weigh bulk numbers, calculating percentages of
possible death in various environmental situations. And in
looking at these vast numerical chartized accounts of human
mortality, one discovers himself to be in greater safety in
a large jumbo jet than anywhere in a four block radius of
one's home. Then why the intense interest in our busy sky-
ways? Perhaps it is because the value of one life, no matter
where it is accidently terminated, cannot be calculated.
There are studies in all fields, all endeavors, to determine
safer ways, methods and ideas which might maximize the number
of injury/death related circumstances. The cockpit of com-
mercial aircraft is no different, it does not escape the
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scrutiny which is constantly and increasingly being made
possible, by modern technology. The modern technology of
today's cockpit environment is the application of a decision
support system - computerized digital avionics.
What exactly is a Decision Support System (DSS) ? What
kind of system are being implemented in the present aircraft
and how do they "support"? What does the future promise for
the DSS in the cockpit environment. These questions are the
basis for the final section.
A. DEFINITION OF A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
The best definition of a DSS that this author has
uncovered is in the introduction of Peter G. Keen & Michael
Morton's book, Decision Support System: An Organizational
Perspective. They state:
"Decision Support System (DSS) represent a point of
view on the role of the computer in the management
decisionmaking process. Decision support implies
the use of computers to
1. Assist managers in their decision processes in
semis tructured task.
2. Support, rather than replace, managerial judgment.
3. Improve the effectiveness of decisionmaking rather
than its efficiency [Ref. 23: pp. 1]
.
The key to a DSS is the human unit. It is the human
unit that utilizes the DSS to arrive at decisions and
process data. A decision algorithm, a decision rule, or
a computer program assists by providing the basis for a




"Software cannot make a choice, since choice is a human
activity. However, software can be used in ranking the
alternatives and otherwise applying decision choice
procedures to support the choice itself." [Ref. 24:
pp. 334].
The manager (in this instance pilot or co-pilot) uses
the DSS to implement arrival at a decision. It would also
be used to selectively ask for information, provide graphical
summaries or time-series analysis as well as arrival at sim-
ple computations, comparisons and projections. The system
is like a sophisticated calculator, preprogrammed to include
some of the manipulations the manager used by habit for such
problems [Ref. 25: pp. 97]. With the DSS, facts or informa-
tion are easily retrievable - making relevant information
accessible almost immediately. These elements of the DSS,
their attributes and applications provide the crew member
with the ability to recognize or decide what constitutes the
problem and help create alternatives in order that a decision
may be reached.
With all the high technology within today's world, what
prevents the computer from total usurption of all decision-
making? There are, indeed, areas that can be handled without
the human unit. Programmed decisions is an area of total
computer application. A programmed decision is one that is
well-defined and is repeated often enough, that decision
rules or decision algorithms may be well defined [Ref. 26:
pp. 321] . Nonprogrammed decisions are not repeated, or not
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repeated frequently, or they are so different at each
repetition that no general model can be developed as a
basis for programming them. The heuristic approach of the
human unit which has been proven to lead to serious diffi-
culties in the section on inferential shortcomings enables
this unit to arrive at conclusions by examining data for
which no algorithm for processing exists.
Software support for generating solutions can also
consist of a structured approach to the problem. In this
way, the computer program leads the decision maker in a
rational search strategy for solutions. These questions
might be followed by a series of questions which help the
decision maker to consider alternatives. The advantage of
structured approaches is that they assist in systematically
exploring the normal decision space. There is a disadvantage,
however; a tendency to suppress search outside the normal
decision space also exists [Ref. 27: pp. 355].
Application of the DSS in the cockpit environment will
be discussed in the following section. It will be shown how
both programmed and nonprogrammed DSS is being implemented.
B. COMPUTERIZED DIGITAL AVIONICS
Computers have emerged into the aviation field as key
tools in every aspect of its industry - from design and
development, to application in flight. Computers are now
absolutely essential in every niche and cranny of the
industry. Augmenting the use of computers across this broad
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range of applications is computer graphics, the integration
of computer hardware, software and display technologies that
produces graphic output [Re.f. 28: pp. 64].
One. of the more recent advances of avionics technology,
which is founded on powerful microprocessors, is providing
pilots with graphic displays of the world beyond the confines
of the cockpit. The computerized graphics "vision" for
commercial aircraft includes weather radar, map navigation,
landing systems, performance monitors for engines, controls,
altitude and other onboard equipment. Electronic flight
instrument systems (EFIS) are not only replacing electro-
mechanical devices, but are providing flight crews with new
data, such as moving map navigation. On the display screen
important flight information, such as flight clearance is
highlighted, by appearing brighter, color coded, and in front
of data of lesser immediacy, i.e., weather radar. These sys-
tems will help eliminate many of the clearance errors, which
were examplified in the case studies. New digital flight
management systems are maximizing efficiency by automatically
flying an aircraft along an optimum flight path.
Color cockpit CRT displays are increasing the amount of
information a pilot can absorb in a finite time frame. The
new Boeing 76 7 has a prototype display of the electronic
attitude director indicator (EADI) . It portrays the sky as
a traditional blue field and the aircraft by yellow/tan
"wings" on either side of a small white square. The white
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line separates the sky from the black earth emphasizes the
artificial horizon. A roll scale of white radial lines
appears at the top of the display, and there are white and
blue horizontal lines for a pitch scale in the center. The
green glide slope deviation scale and magenta pointer are
displayed along the left side of the screen. The green speed
deviation scale and magenta pointer are on the right. This
display area is 4.7 in. wide by 4.2 in. high.
In some applications, as in the blue sky field on the
EADI , color is used in the electronic instructions to retain
the conventional appearance of an instrument. Its chief
purpose, however, is to facilitate differentiation between
diverse categories of information.
Color also is used to heighten contrasts in weather
data, i.e., in a manner similar to that used in false-color
processing of satellite imagery. A total of seven stable
controllable colors are used in the flight instrument dis-
plays, but others could be added.
There are many avionic advances in use on the Boeing 75 7
and 76 7. These include:
- Programmable central digital warning and caution
system
- CRT keyboard/display unit for the. Sperry Flight
Systems Flight Management System
- Digital auto-pilot and flight director system
- Thrust management system
- An electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI)
that allows the pilot to page through displays to




Within the flight management system two kinds of data
are stored:
1. Locations of Airports, VOR stations and other hard
data. This information also is used to initialize
the Boeing 767' s inertial reference system.
2. Selected company routes and standard departure and
arrival routes (SIDS and STARS) [Ref. 29: pp. 57].
The thrust management system is designed to eliminate
essentially all throttle stagger and insure that an engine
will provide take-off thrust (but no more) anytime the
throttle is moved to the full forward position. By con-
trast, most engines in current aircraft exceed engine
limits if a throttle is pushed to the physical stops. The
thrust management system combines a primary digital electro-
nic system with a backup conventional hydromechanical one.
The aircraft can be flown with only the hydromechanical
controls.
C. FUTURE OF DSS IN THE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT
These systems onboard the new Boeing 75 7 & 76 7 are
today's application of the computer into the cockpit envi-
ronment. What wonders lie in store for the future? The
May 11, 1981 issue of AWST brings forth the use of voice
interactive avionics.
Using a verbec connected-speech, speaker-independent
type of speech recognition equipment with a working vocab-
ualry of approximately 70 words, the FAA has demonstrated
that it is feasible for a pilot to file a flight plan
50

directly into a computer without human intervention. The
FAA also plans to evaluate the use of voice recognition
equipment as a means of directly "driving" the technical
center's digital traffic control simulator.
Speech recognition systems currently are available from
seven commercial suppliers, but they are designed for use
under operating conditions that are far more benign than an
aircraft cockpit.
Growing numbers of military and civil aircraft will be
outfitted with "talking avionics" for a variety of functions.
This is a result of rapid advances in microcircuits than can
generate a natural-sounding voice coupled with low cost
resulting from growing consumer market applications. The
initial application of voice warnings on the USAF/General
Dynamics B-58 Hustler proved too cumbersome, expensive and
unreliable. Since that time, the cost of synthesized -
voice microcircuits has dropped significantly, and the
vocabulary versatility has increased.
The use of the highlighted CRT could be invaluable in
minimizing many of the clearance problems encountered in the
case studies. A "file drawer system", i.e., each step of the
clearance is highlighted as execution of a previous step is
completed would allow the flight crew to know exactly where
they are at the present, clearance wise, at all times. This
way he/she would be receiving the clearance not only verbally
but visually as well. This system of counter-checking would
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save time since the pilot or co-pilot would not have to
physically write down the clearance.
It is easy to project that all the varieties of duties
that computers are able to accomplish in today's space
shuttle industry will soon be applicable to the commercial
aircraft. The military now has drone plane and the Tomahawk
Cruise Missiles - both pre-programmed or directed from ground
control. Perhaps one day, the airlines of the future will





In looking over the 22 case studies presented by NASA,
it is very simple to recognize areas where a DSS could be
utilized. A DSS in the cockpit environment could become the
third crew member, the one who would not anticipate or assume,
who could not hold a rank prejudice, who would not be sus-
ceptible to the "human element". In fact it would be the
crew member which would provide countermeasures to the human
element.
Modern technology has not yet provided the aviation
industry with a viable cost-efficient method of total eli-
mination of the human unit from the cockpit of commercial
aircraft. That reality is still in the land of tomorrow.
What we do have (as related in the cockpit description of
the Boeing 757 and 767) are decision support systems which
can support.
The new digital flight instrument panels with com-
puterized flight maintenance systems will greatly assist
those areas specified as "psychological refractory phase"
and "reductive coding". Perhaps the greatest area helped
of the four discussed in this thesis, will be the one
entitled "reductive coding". With more of the input data
being programmed into the computer system of the aircraft,
there will be less tendency toward error. The pilot will
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have more time to make clear, concise decisions in attending
to regular duties as well as emergency situations which might
arise.
Retroactive Interference could be at least made less of
a threat with the use of programmed flight plans (SIDS and
STARS) and a wide variety of electronic alarms to indicate
deviations from a scheduled maneuver. The DSS would not,
however, prohibit initial input of incorrect data. The human
element, in all its fallability, could easily continue creat-
ing errors. Perhaps the only true safeguard against lapsing
into prior input errors is constant vigilance and awareness
of the possibility that it was feasible. This is also the
case for errors by "inferential shortcomings".
Human inference does not need to be eliminated. In fact,
judgmental decisions based on inference are the factors that
the human unit can contribute, to the DSS. The errors related
in the case studies presented on human inference could have
been avoided had proper cockpit discipline been maintained.
If procedures are completed in specified sequence, errors by
assumption would be decreased.
Lack of leadership and poor crew coordination lie totally
on the human side of the cockpit environment. The only way
to erase errors due to these element would be elimination of
the human unit entirely. Training in communication skills
would do a great deal in bringing the problem into awareness




A DSS can provide a wide variety of levels of support.
The DSS's in operation in today's airlines are able to
enhance the pilot and co-pilot's ability to achieve all the
goals needed for safe flight. In congruence with the support,
careful attitude and attention to proper sequence and duty





INCIDENTS COMPILED BY NASA
ACCESSION NO. 013 8 NARRATIVE :ACFT.
A was cautioned for jet blast from the departing ACFT B on
RWY 19 and advised at pilot's discretion to taxi into posi-
tion and hold. The captain of ACFT A was working the radios
and I, the co-pilot was at the controls. The captain acknowl-
edged the above clearance, I misinterpreted the clearance
and was assured in my mind we were cleared for take-off, I
taxied the airplane slowly onto the RWY to avoid the jet blast
from the departing ACFT B, as I gave the aircraft takeoff
power I heard the captain say "cleared to go". After becoming
airborne I held best-angle-of-climb to avoid the wake turbu-
lence from the departing ACFT B. I put the gear in the up
position, at that time I heard the tower issue us traffic on
29. The next thing I saw was an ACFT B pass slightly behind
and below us as we crossed the 19/29 intersection. Then the
tower came back and apologized for clearing us to take-off,
we continued the flight as planned. Later I found out that
the captain asked me "if we were cleared to go", I only heard
him say "cleared to go". If I had any doubts they were abol-
ished by that statement. I don't know why I misunderstood
the clearance, I haven't heard the tapes yet. I believe




Reporter's Recommendations: I wish the controller would
have said, "taxi into position and hold". I took off because
I thought the tower had cleared us to go, when the captain
asked me, "if we were cleared to go". And I misunderstood
the statement for "cleared to go", it confirmed my belief.
I believe the incident would have been avoided if the tower




Shortly after passing MOD (Modesto) , OAK ATC cleared us to
cross CEDES at 11,000 and 25Q KTS , the first officer was
flying the aireplane and he thought ATC wanted us to slow
down at that time and then descend. I re-checked with ATC
and they confirmed that they wanted us to cross CEDES at
11,000 at 25 KTS and we could slow down any time we wanted
to. They also advised that if we would have any problem in
making those restrictions they would waive them. I told
them we could probably make it O.K. about 12-15 miles east
of CEDES were given a clearance that was hard to read and
about all we got for sure was a turn to a heading for a
vector to the SFO localizer, I asked the controller to
confirm this and he repeated the clearance but in the mean-
time the first officer was slowing the rate of descent and
reducing air speed since he felt the latest clearance
cancelled any previous restrictions that may have applied
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at CEDES. When we had the controller repeat the clearance
and confirm it he said we were cleared to leave CEDES on an
assigned heading at 11,0 00. By now we are very close to
CEDES just leaving 12,000 and slowing from about 290 KTS
to 250 KTS. I told the first officer to get down to 11,000+
immediately and then slow to 25Q KTS. He was under the
impression that our crossing altitude at CEDES was no longer
a restriction. We crossed CEDES between 11,000+ and 12,000+
and slowed to 250KTS within a few miles after passing the
intersection. There were no subsequent communication diffi-
culties. The thing that touched off the whole espisode was
the difficulty in reading the controller when he gaveus the
clearanceto URN toan assigned heading when we were approaching
CEDES. There was nothing wrong with our airplane receivers.
The controller sounded as though he was not ennunciating his
words clearly but rather was slurring them together and
trying to speak too rapidly. When he slowed up his delivery
a little and spoke more clearly neither the first officer or
I had any problem in understanding him.
ANALYSIS
The result of this misunderstanding led to no dire incident.
It does point out, however, the absolute necessity of veri-






Prior to departure from Hotsprings (HOT) , Arkansas, airline
flight received IFR clearance for Hot Tower, ... V-54N main-
tain 5000, contact LittleRock (LIT) approach control at
Benton intersection. First officer read clearance back to
tower as issued. Flight crew missreadclearance and proceed
as cleared (and as filed) to 7000 instead of 5000. (7000 is
FAL center stored flight plan) . The error was not discovered
until flight reported over Benton intersection. If an alti-
tude verification had been required prior to Benton inter-
section, the incident could have been avoided, as it was
however, flight flew one half of the flight segment without
being required to verify the assigned altitude of 5000.
Flight monitored Hot Tower Frequency until Benton inter-
section.
ANALYSIS
The reporters suggestion to always verify clearances is
valid. It points out the vital necessity for a complete
crew concept.
CALLBACK/COMMENTS
This is an example of what can happen when there is a change
from S.O.P. Although the F/O received the altered altitude,
of 5000 t the crew had been so accustomed to flying the center





1 respectfully recommend that altitude verification be made
to Hot Tower immediately after takeoff. I might add that
Hot has no departure control as such.
ACCESSION NO. :2137
NARRATIVE
After landing on 2MR which is one of the south runways, I
taxied north toward the terminal building, which is north
of Runway 26. The normal route was not used, due to about
1500 FT of Runway 33 being closed. (Runway 33 is the normal
taxi route) I mention that this information was not given
to me by ground control or NTAMS or ATIS. This did not
contribute directly to the incident, but indirectly, on
arrival on- Taxiway C, paralleling Runway 33 and holding
short of Runway 26. I was Number 3 to cross Runway 26.
However, there was another airline ACFT B outbound on Taxi-
way C on the north side of 26 which helped to create the
problem. After sitting for a couple of minutes, ground
control cleared ACFT B across Runway 26, but used the wrong
trip number twice and also the pilot missed one transmission.
By the time this was straightened out, it was to late for
anyone to cross, due to departures off 26. After a couple
more minutes, this trip was cleared across and I was Number
2 to cross. There had been several transmissions during this
time that were broken or garbled and the outbound traffic was
getting impatient about how they were going to getby the
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inbound traffic. After more waiting, there was a break
in departures and they cleared two or three more trips
across Runway 26 which I thought I was one. The first
officer tried to confirm this, but got no reply from
ground control, which I took as another indication that
we were already cleared. After crossing the runway and
being almost to the gate, ground control asked if. 660 was
across the runway and the F/O replied, we were. Ground
control comments was good luck. I feel the cause of this
incident (which happens very frequently here in Atlanta)
is the fact that under normal conditions at busy times of
the day, ground control frequencies are overloaded and
jammed and handling more traffic than one man on one
frequency can control and when taxi routes are closed it
compounds the problem.
ANALYSIS
If the allegations are true, the ground control situation
at the ATL ispretty bad. The problem must also be obvious
to the operating personnel.
REPORTER+S RECOMMENDATIONS
Traffic control of taxing aircraft on high density airports
need some other type of communication other than radio due
to mixing trip numbers. Blocked transmission and blank
spots on airports. There were no near misses or any other
type of hazard in this crossing. However, Atlanta has had






Enroute from SHV, to DFW, cruising altitude, 16000 FT - on
the scurry four arrival (STAR) , into DFW, we were given a
descent to 6000 FT. in the area of GLADD intersection we
were slowing at 10,000 and the controller asked us our alti-
tude. I replied 10,000 (the first officer was flying the
aircraft.) The controller replied - climb and maintain
11,000 - you are supposed to be at eleven. We immediately
climbed to 11,000. (The visibility was good and as far as
I know there was no traffic conflict.) I then told him I
thought we were cleared to 6000 FT. He said he cleared us
to maintain 11,000 to the laned intersection and then to
descent to 6000. He further stated that I read it back to
him that way. Background: we were almost an hour late out
of SHV due to a mechanical. At the time of the descent
clearance I was conferring with the FLT. Attendent on
close passenger connections at DFW. (I was operating the
radio. The F/O was flying the aircraft, there was no S/O)
.
There was several items in the descent clearance - descent
altitude, altimeter setting, and O.K. to disregard the
speed restrictions and probably a couple of other things
If the controller did clear us as he stated, then I believe
the situation occurred for three reasons. 1. I misunderstood
the clearance or it did not register in my mind (The F/O
missed it also) . 2. the distractions in the cockpit by the
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FLT attendant (not her fault) . 3. The common practice
of giving rapidly read descent clearances with several
items in it.
REPORTER+S RECOMMENDATIONS
On two crew member aircraft - 1. Sterile cockpit (no
extraneous conversation by FLT attendants, jump seat riders,
or even among pilotsthemselves) . A. During reading of any
checklist. B. Descentto after landing. 2. When altitude
change is given by controller that should be the only item
in that transmission it should be read back by pilot and
then other items transmitted. Comment: Many times when a
descent clearance is rapidly given with, several items in it.
The crew member parrots it back and then tries to digest it
in his mind. With complicated clearances there is always
the possibility of missing or confusing part of it, espe-
cially if the pilot is unfamiliarwith airport/area/approval.
ACCESSION NO. :25 36
NARRATIVE
The captain was flying, myself copilot copies change of
clearance from 179. 1LM ARD to direct HAW ARZ after copying
clearance I looked at the captain and though he indicated
he got the new clearance as hechanged the VOR FREQ from 1LM
to HAW. But due to the high hekept what appeared to be me
to be a wind correction. Unknown to me he was proceeding
to 1LM. Just about 1LM the center questioned our route
of flight, then immediately changed our clearance back to




An assumption on the co-pilots part that could have led to
serious consequences had other traffic been involved. An
example of what canresult when all clearances are not veri-
fied by all crew members.
REPORTERtS RECOMMENDATIONS
Further development of windshield or whatever causes high
noise level in cockpit of this airline ACFT type.
ITEM 41
ACCESSION NO. :29 33
NARRATIVE
On the ground at PAX the F.O. called for ATC clearance to
sea, clearance was field-maintain 9000 - expect FLY level
200 3 min. Af terdep~a"rture~, departure freq. and- transponder
code was also given. I missed the first portion of the
clearance and picked it up at F.L. 200 (the center stored
ALT) and got the freq. and transponder code, Iset 20000 in
the ALT. Alert unit and set in the transponder code as the
F.O. read back the clearance. Again I did not hear the 90Q0
restriction and asked if we were cleared as field - the F.O.
answered yes, I thought I understood the entire clearance.
The F.O. made the takeoff and I changed to DEPT . control
and reported leaving 100 FT and climbing to F.L. 20 The
controller said ^ROGER^ and gave us additional climb instruc-
tions which included a heading change at 250 FTAT about
8000 FT the F.O. asked if we had been cleared to 20000 andl
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replied, Yes - at 10000 FT. The controller asked what ALT.
we hadbeen cleared to and again I replied 2000. He said we
should have been stopped at 9000 then cleared us to F.O. 200
and asked us to expedite thru 11000 which we did. The F.O.
later said we had been clearedto 9000 originally, but thought
we had been recleared to FL 20 andhe had missed the re-
clearance. The crew composition helped create this situation
as the F/0 regularly flew this trip, the CAPT. was a manage-
ment pilot who hadnt flown the route recently and the S/O
was a reserve who was totally unfamiliar with the route.
The F/O on taxi-in at PDX, unknown to the CAPT. had set
9000 FT in ALT. ALERT SYS. in anticipation of what he knew
was a normally ALT. restriction for departure, when the CAPT.
thought he was given F.L. 20 with the clearnce he set in
that altitude replacing the 9000 FT - this was missedalso
by the F.O. and he read back the clearance and was not
rechecked for a proper setting pror to takeoff. The CAPT.
checked in wih departure control after takeoff and stated
he was climbing to F.L. 200and received no correction. When
the F.O. asked if we had been cleared to 200 FT and got a
positive answer he assumed he had missed something and
continued to climb thru 9000 FT.
ANALYSIS





I will attempt to prevent a recurrance of this type situation
by discussing the entire clearance with the crew and request-
ing ALT. verification when I change controllers during climb
and descent. I will also discourage the presetting of instru-
ments until after the clearance has been received and reviewed
and I will encourage the other crew members to be more inqui-




While being vectored for an approach and landing on RW 22R
approach, the following took place. Approach control when
querried as to other traffic stated that we were his- only
IFR traffic but numerous others were arriving from other
sectors and that he was working on a slot for us. The
potential problem arose as the controller turned and des-
cended us from a close high right downwind leg (0 40 DEC
HDG) to a 80 DEG heading while calling out the position
of the traffic we were to follow on final, the captain mis-
took the heading to be 180 DEG as this was a logical heading
to intercept final as the downwind was somewhat tight to
the runway, I acknowledged the 8Q DEG heading and looked
out the window for the 1:00 otclock traffic at 3 miles.
Theonly traffic I saw appeared at 2:00 to 2:30 and looked
to be 5 or Smiles. I asked the controller if this was our
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traffic and he replied with ^whatts your heading^ I
looked back into the cockpit to discover we were turning
thru 170 DEG and said to the captain that we should be
heading Q80 DEG. I told the controller we were 17Q DEG
correcting back to the assigned. At this point the cptain
and I saw our traffic at 11:00 otclock 2 1/2 to 3 miles.
The controller said the heading should be easterly. I then
acknowledged the traffic and we werethen cleared for a visual
approach. We made a left turn and one ^S^TURN to position
ourselves behind the traffic and proceeded without further
confusion to the airport and landed. The conditions here
inmarginal VFR weather could be a setup for a near miss or
midair. Fortunately, we were in clear air. Pilots and
controllers anticipatingvisual approaches to expedite arrivals,
save fuel and in general ease the burdens of day to day air
operations could enter into this type of potentially hazaard-
ous situations. Hopefully this contributioncan be of assis-
tance in developing procedures and techniques for smoother
and safer transitions.
ANALYSIS





ACCESSION NO. :326 7
NARRATIVE
During CAPT+S P/A talk to PSGtS we received a change of
HDS and change of ALT. from 900Q to 14000+ CAPT started
climb and changedpower while talking. When I finished
talking F/O said left to 16 DEG I turned A/0 and kept
climbing - 16000 was in ALT reminder window. Leveled off
at 16000 FT. called OPTR CTL and requested higher. Was
advised we should be on CTR control. Called center, he
asked if this was our first call, said yes, he asked for
ALT, said 16000. He said we should be at 14000 but climb
to FL230. We did we dontt know who put 16000 in window
of ALT reminder, we could not recall any conversation
about changing to center. No. 1 radio still on DPT/CTL
No. 2on TWR at ATL , Man on DPT CTL did not seem to recognize
us when we talked to him.
REPORTER! S RECOMMENDATIONS
Personal cockpit proceedures now incorporate a definite
change of control when the man currantly flying makes a




On T/O we were told to turn RT on top 7000 FT. I started
to him RT and CO. pilot said no he read back left turn.
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Because for years we have turned left on thist/O I took
co-pilot word instead of clarifying with DEPT. control.
He stopped my turn at 2 70 DEG. and advised me the landings
were on 8 and we were turning into traffic. We did not
come close to any other ACFT and he climbed us up our
landing traffic and continued left turn to our course.
REPORTER+S RECOMMENDATIONS
I, as Capt, should have clarified, the turn when the
disagreement inconflict occurred.
ITEM 5 7
ACCESSION NO. :3 318
NARRATIVE
We were inbound to MEM from the NO., on a downwind, west
of the airport, 35L and right were active. Visibiltiy. was.
6 to 7 in haze. We were cleared for the visual to 35L with
an altitude restriction to maintain 3000 FT. We maneuvered
for the approach but couldn+t get a lower because ACFT B was
on approach for 35R at 2000 FT, and we didntt have visual
contact with this ACFT. By the time we saw the other ACFT
and could be cleared out of 3000, we were well above profile
and behind on the check list and crew duties. In the rush,
approach control either didntt turn us over to Tower or we
failed to respond to his instructions, in any event the
landing was made without a proper landing clearance.
Separation between the two ACFT was positive at all times
and was never compromised. The only problem was that the
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visual search for the other ACFT and the delay in descent
created an unusually heavy work load on the crew.
ANALYSIS
Appears to be a communication problem confounded with the
requirement to look out for other ACFT. If approach control
had furnished proper vectors for spacing the pilots work




At lift off on RWY 8R our forward entry door warning LGT
came on. Adecision was made to return and land. APC
vectored us for a base TORWY 17L and CLRD us for a visual,
to contact TWR on final. During this short period time,
about 4 MINS the ck lists were run, LNDG gross WGT oktd
and while I worked APPCH CTONROL the first officer was
advising the CO. and MNTNC of our action. Turning base
the first officer returned to APC and I switched to the
P.A. to advise the passangers of the prop and our intentions
Turning finals there was a momentary destraction over ^ BUG
SPEED ^ as called by first officer and whatwas indicated on
my airspeed indicator. This was resolved and the APPCH made
to a LNDG - without contacting DEN TWRI I believe the AMT of
communication involved in such a short time, the fact that
at onepoint each of us worked APC CTL while the other was
attending to other contacts (plus the distraction at the
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point a change to TWR wuldnormally be made) lead to this
oversight on our part, probably froma subjective assumption
the other had made the TWR contact. The situation probably
would not have developed had one crew member stayed in
contact with CTL during the whole APPCH and it of course
brings up the need for constant vigilance against ^assumptions^
ANALYSIS
It appears that the RPTR has made an excellent analysis of
the situation. Distraction and certain MT of stree can lead




As CPTN I misinterprted the assigned FLT ALT as being 16 000
MSL wherein we were assigned 14000 MSL. First officer had
read back CLRNC correctly when rectd from CDC RDD , however,
we both neglected to setalt reminder (non ACCRAL SYS) to
1400Q. The ALT reminder was set atl6000 (previous legs
assigned ALT) . When the ATC CLRCN was rectd engins and
misread the CLRNC to read 16000 FT MSL instead of 14000
MSL. on LCB out thru 154000 LAX CTR aksed us our indicated
ALT, we replied passing thru 15400 for 16000. He then
issued us 16000 as assigned ALT. It is normal procedure
for our airline to reset the ALT reminder to FT when
either CLRD for APPCH, or cancelling IFR CLRNC. This




An admitted pilot error.
REPORTERtS RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend the non flying pilot always read back ALT
assignments, and the flying pilot always set the ALT
reminder. This should help to prevent 4 dangerous
incident like this from happing when the GRND , and the
F/0 is copying the initial ATC CLRCN , the CPTN should





Clearance was received by first officer for flight to cross
15 DM W of FRR at or below 2300Q+ . Flight attendant dis-
cussing cabin situation with captain. CAPT . believed 2 300
restriction was for 10DME and crossed 15 DME at little less
than 24000+ at approx 3500+ FPM rateof descent previous
cockpit coordination had been good and correctdiscipline
maintained. For some unknown reason F/O failed to question
or mention rate of descent necessary to cross correct DME
point at altitude requested. CAPT believing crossing was
5 MI further east did not change descent rate as previously
planned to cross the 10 DME fix at or below 2300Q+.
ANALYSIS





Believe more attention to strict cockpit discipline and
less distraction from cabin attendants during climbs and
descents would minimize this type of incident. Current
company procedures do attempt to preclude or eliminate
these distractions. Stricter cockpit discipline is the




Pilot in command performed totally unnecessary and violet
low altitude maneuver attempting to complete a close in
visual approach, once the situation was underway the alter-
native "for other- flight crew members were- either a -fight
for the controls at 500 FT or verbal suggestions and protests
In this case the latter was chosen. Aside from irresponsible
and reckless individuals who must be dealt with, this situa-
tion once again points up the need for early and forceful
crewmember input to the pilot to prevent condition from
deteriroating to the point of crisis. Without this input,
even a conscientious pilot (perhaps not perceiving a critical
factor) might then try to complete an approach which should
be abandoned.
ANALYSIS








Myself and the rest of crew deadheaded from MTS to PIT on
Flight 20 4 and proceeded to Gate 16 where outbound equipment
for Flight 231 was scheduled for departure at approximately
1340E. We found Flight 287 still on gate. Maintenance
informed us our aircraft was still at the hanger and would
be parked on Gate 16. We left our bags and proceeded to
operations. In operations we checked TV monitor which
indicated Gate 16 aircraft still at hanger. I proceeded
in completing of flight plan which indicated PIT to SDF
fuel load 22,000 LBS. CAPTAINWHELCHEL and myself discussed
enrout weather or thunderstorm lines etc, periodically
checking TV monitor. At approximately 135 5E (1755Z) the
TV monitor still indicated aircraft at hanger but decided
to proceed gate anyway. Captain and myself arrived at
Gate 16 at approximately 1400E (1P00Z) and found aircraft _
.
at the gate. I performed walk around inspection while
Captain boarded the aircraft. When I boarded the aircraft
I found fuel slip for 24,600 LBS in area of radar scope and
placed it on my side assuming that extra fuel was added
because of weather enroute. I proceeded to read check list
to Captain and at fuel, oil, hydraulic quantities checked
fuel slip and informed Captain I had fuel slip and completed
check list. We were ready for push back at 1410E (181QZ)
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on schedule and contacted ground control, also during,
push back I was receiving ATC clearance. After completing
after start check list proceeded to Runway 28R. Completing
before take off checklist. At this time I added an addi-
tional 2600 LBS offuel to take off weight and gave corrected
take off weight. Since it was my leg to fly, I performed
normal take-off at 1416E (1816Z) and climb out. At approx-
imately 15,000 FT I changed to center tank andnoticed no
fuel in center. I immediately looked at fuel slip, sincel
knew fuel should be in center tank and informed Captain that
no fuel was in center tank , who by this time was looking at
fuel quantities also. Captain said ^SOMETHING CRAZY HERE^
We leveled off at approximately FL210 and I pulled pwr back
while we were determining the problem. After discussing the
matter, we decided we had to go withthe present indication
of fuel and decided CMH as being our best place for landing
to have checked. We contacted systems control and received
amended release to CMH at 1427E (182777) 11 minutes after
take off, at this time, during descent into CMH we informed
flight attendants of the problem and that we were landing at
CMH, also informedpassengers of problem on PA. Proceeded to
CMH with normal landing at 1447E (134 77) and taxied to gate.
At the gate, we had dip sticks and all guages checked and
found fuel to agree with indications. We had aircraft
fueled and informed passengers that the problem had been
corrected and we were taking on additional fuel as a
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Pilots assumed a fuel slip in the cockpit was the proper
slip for their flight. Fuel handler smudged flight number.
Refueling personnel notified company, during pushback , that
flight was not refueld. ' Compnay failed to notify pilots.
The gate coordinator in the Tower forgot about it. When




When the original clearance was received RWY 5 was in use.
The clearance was a TULANCLINGO DEPT. (Via ME TCG) . Upon
departing terminal the active Runway has changed to RWY 23.
After takeoff on RWY 2 3R, departure control i^s clearance was
to proceed to MW then turn right to heading 340 DEC The
co-pilot was flying the aircraft and apparently missed the
clearance from departure control and started a left turn as
per the TCG departure. Language problem contributed to the
mis-understanding of the clearance. In the left turn I said
to the co-pilot, ^we were suppose to turn to the rights and
he assuredme that the correct turn was to the left. As we
were in the left turn, departure control came on and advised
us that we were cleared for a rightturn. I explained that
we had mis-understood the clearance and thatwe were proceeding
to ME for ATCG departure. Departure control thencleared us to
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ME and a change of frequency, and at that time nothing more
was said of the incident. In retrospect, better cockpit
discipline would have prevented this incident.
ANALYSIS
Both captain andF-0 apparently did+t register the clearance.
F-0 didn+t seem to hear the clearance and talked the captain
out of whatthe captain thought was a new clearance with a
right turn. Crew could have been in attentive, or cockpit
noise and wolkload during takeoff climb make that period a
difficult time to receive clearances.
CALLBACK/COMMENTS : NONE




ATC told us to expect 250 KT lOOQQt restriction at saddle
intersection, but didntt give us a clearence to descent.
I repeat the clearence to the controller and asked the
copilot who was flying it he understood. He said yes. ATC
kept us 33000 longer than normal and did not tell us they
had traffic at 31000. We were well past normal descent
point and I turned to get something out of my flight bag.
While I was looking for the object the co-pilot started a
descent without my knowledge. The altitude alerter went off
and the co-pilot reset it to 1000Q. I did not hear the
Alerter go off, ATC asked if we were descending, I looked at
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he altitude and we were at 31700 DEG. , I immediately
told the co-pilot to climb and told ATC that we had left
our altitude by mistake. He (ATC) then cleared us to
10Q00 and said we had traffic at 31000. The co-pilot had
about 4 months as co-pilot. I think, he became nervous that
he was so high and turned the expected clearance in his mind
to an actual clearance.
ANALYSIS
Copilot incorrectly began descent before being cleared.
Captain mayhave point that a restriction mentioning speed
and altitude might better be given after clearance to des end,
there+s less chance for misinterpretation.
CALLBACK/COMMENTS : NONE
REPORTERtS RECOMMENDATIONS
I dontt think the incident would have happened if ATC had not
giventhe expected restrictions until after they had given us
clearence to descent.
ITEM 82
ACCESSION NO. : 572(1
NARRATIVE
LT cleared to 6000 t co-pilot was operating controls, captain
was looking in his book of approach plates. Co pilot was
turnning ADF NAV AID to 34 4 AVN AVON outer marker locater.
Aircraft was at 10QQQ+ slowing from 350 KTS to 250 KTS . with
attention diverted to tuning and identifying OM locator,




3oth pilots distracted, allowed aircraft to descend above
max speed, pilot error.
CALLBACK/COMMENTS : NONE




Our aircraft arrived on OMA I went into the operations
office to check WX use the restroom. On returning to the
aircraft I asked the F.O. if we had an ATC clearance. He
replied that we did I asked him what it was. He said
^CLEARED AS FILED MAINTAIN 5 000 EXPECT 11Q0 10 MIN AFTER
DEPARTURE.^ Our flight plans are all center storred and I
asked him ^How are we filed?* to verify the routing I had on
mycenter storred flight plan his, as filed, was the same
as my as filed, namely V159 3TJ direct MCI. The departure
went normally We were handed off to center (Minneapolis)
As I flew the ACFT on the previos routing to llOOOt, we
crossed OMA VOR proceeded on course V159. Approx 25 N.W.
SE of OMA VOR as we were being handed off to Kansas City
center Minneapolis asked ^Are you flying the Omaha 1
arrival*?* I answered that we werenlt that it was my
understanding we were cleared V159. He said that we weren+t
but that we could work it out with Kansas City. Handoff was
detected Kansas City turned us to 165DEG Vectored us the
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approach gate at Kansas City. I again asked the F/0 for
the clearance that he copied He said that it was his
mistake that he did not know what Omaha 1 arrival mean
that he checked my approach rates HIS Neither of us had
a Omaha S.I.D. by that name so he ignored it but read the
clearance back ^KANSAS CITY ASFILED MAINTAIN 5000, expect
11000 10 min. after departure. And thatOmaha clearance
delivery accepted the read back and that he did notthink
to ask me about Omaha One Arrival when I returned to the
aircraft. I felt like I had been sold down the river by
an otherwise very trustworthy, competent F/O. Clearly,
he made a serious mistake as I suppose I did in not checking
the clearance with clearance delivery, to do so however would
surely leave your F.O with the feeling that ^THIS GUY DOESN+T
TRUST iME^ , which is now the case. But on the other hand
trust coordination are definitely necessary for a safe
operation. While crosscheck is a healthy worthwhile
cockpit activity, it becomes counter productive when one
crew member feels 7*1 +m getting a check ride^ from the other
crew members. For this reason, I probably wontt question
the next clearance I get from this or any other F.O, but
I til be uneasy The nagging fear that he may have miscopied
or misunderstood will be in the back of my mind, many of our
days require 14 hrs in the cockpit the physiological needs
of crew members necessitate that all are not going to be
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